Political innovation and inter-ethnic alliance
Kayapo resistance to the developmentalist state

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Fig. 1. March 2006 participants in the Piraçu meeting form up for a ritual dance to inaugurate the proceedings.

This article deals with an outstanding example of a general phenomenon: the resurgence of indigenous peoples as political actors and as vital and innovative cultural communities, not only at local but at national and global levels. The recent surge of indigenous struggles for greater political, economic and cultural autonomy has coincided with the latest stage of global centralization of capital that began in the late 1960s. It must thus be understood in the context of the transformations of nation-states and their internal social relations associated with what has come to be called ‘globalization’. Among these transformations have been changes in the relations of state regimes to relatively marginal and formerly stigmatized identity groups, ethnic and cultural minorities in their populations, among whom indigenous peoples are invariably numbered.

For reasons not yet fully understood, these changes have created new opportunities for indigenous groups to challenge national governments and even political-economic processes at the heart of the global economic system. The result has been an inversion of received ideas about the limited possibilities for resistance by oppressed minorities and people in marginalized social categories to the conditions of their subjugation, as represented for example by James Scott’s notions of the ‘weapons of the weak’ and the necessarily covert and secretive forms of resistance he calls ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott 1985, 1990). The flagrantly overt defiance by the Kayapo of the Brazilian Amazon against threats to their territorial rights and environment from state and corporate development projects, which we describe in this article, constitutes a counter-example to Scott’s views. We shall take up some general implications of this discrepancy in the conclusion of our paper.

The Kayapo, or Mebengokre as they call themselves, are an indigenous society with a current population of about 7000. They occupy a large territory of some 140,000 km², with 21 villages scattered over the middle Xingú river valley and those of its eastern tributaries, in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso (MT) and Pará (PA). Most, but not all, of their traditional territory has been recognized by the state as reserves under their control, following political and diplomatic campaigns, including low-intensity armed struggle, dating back to the early 1970s.

In recent years, however, the Kayapo and many other Brazilian indigenous peoples have discovered that the formal recognition of their territories as reserves does not mean that they are secure from massive intrusions by development projects directly instigated or fostered by federal and state governments – projects which would have, and in some cases have had, devastating effects on their communities and environments. To combat these projects the Kayapo have been forced to reach out for support to non-Kayapo indigenous allies and non-indigenous organizations such as NGOs, some parts of the Brazilian government, Brazilian settler organizations of the Xingú valley, foreign governments and anthropologists. As the pressures have intensified, mutually rivalrous and distrustful Kayapo communities have come together in a common campaign under unified leadership. We begin our article by describing the meeting through which this was accomplished.
Uniting against the common enemy

Two hundred representatives of 19 of the 21 Kayapo communities met for five days in the village of Piaraqü on the Xingú River between 28 March and 1 April 2006 (the two absent communities had wanted to attend but were unable to find the money for travel expenses). The main subject of discussion was the need to present a common front against the Brazilian government’s attempts to revive its perennial project to build hydroelectric dams at Belo Monte and four other sites on the Xingú River and its main tributary, the Iriri. The meeting was the culmination of years of organization and alliance-building by the Kayapo, under the leadership of Megaron Txukarramãe, a Kayapo from the village of Mentukirine who is also director of the regional office of FUNAI, the Brazilian agency for Indian affairs in Mato Grosso. The objective of this protracted Kayapo campaign has been to put together a united front of all the peoples of the Xingú Valley, some 25 distinct indigenous groups and organizations of national Brazilian settlers, against the proposed Xingú dams and other environmentally destructive development projects (Fajans-Turner and Turner 2005).

The Kayapo and their allies insist that they are not opposed to development as such, but rather to the approach to development perennially favoured by Brazilian government planners. This typically stresses big, capital-intensive infrastructure projects, such as giant hydroelectric dams and highways driven through fragile ecosystems in violation of the legal and human rights of local populations, without regard to the environmental damage and social disruption they cause. This policy and its associated ideology has come to be called ‘developmentalism’ in contrast to other approaches to development that emphasize smaller-scale, local labour-intensive inputs and environmentally sustainable production.

The first step in the Kayapo campaign to build an effective movement of resistance to the Xingú dams and other developmentalist projects in their area had been to mend their relations with the other indigenous groups of the Xingú valley. Mutual antagonism and distrust had become particularly intense with the Upper Xinguano indigenous communities of the National Park of the Xingú. Kayapo leaders dealt with these tensions by inviting representatives of these groups to attend a meeting in November 2003, at the Kayapo village of Piaraqü, located on the east bank of the Xingú by the northern border of the park. At the meeting Megaron and other Kayapo speakers successfully persuaded the representatives of the other groups that the threat posed by the dams and pollution from encroaching cattle ranches and soya plantations to the river on which they all depended made a common struggle to save the Xingú essential. Even the new president of FUNAI, Dr Mércio Pereira Gomes, made an appearance at the meeting to give his blessing to the new era of peaceful relations among the indigenous peoples of the Xingú, although he carefully avoided taking the Indians’ side against the dams and other developmentalist projects that threatened their home territories (Fajans-Turner 2003, Fajans-Turner and Turner 2005).

One intractable problem remained: three of the largest Kayapo villages from the eastern part of Kayapo territory had boycotted the meeting because of their longstanding rivalry with the western Kayapo communities under Megaron’s leadership. Before the Kayapo could hope to lead a united indigenous coalition to save the Xingú, they had to overcome their own internal divisions. In December 2005, Megaron made a personal tour of the Kayapo villages, including those that had not attended the 2003 meeting. The immediate objective of the visits was to persuade all the communities to send representatives to
another meeting at Piaçarçu, this one to be limited exclusively to Kayapo and their close neighbours and allies, the Panará and some Juruna who were currently living at Piaçarçu with the Kayapo.

Megaron’s tour was a complete success, resulting in the second Piaçarçu meeting in March 2006. This meeting achieved all that Megaron had hoped. The hitherto recalcitrant eastern villages attended and joined with the other communities in a unanimous consensus to begin organizing a movement of all the ‘peoples of the Xingú’ against the dams. Over 100 speakers at the week-long meeting rejected construction of the dams, alleging that they would have catastrophic effects on the riverine ecosystem, and would flood large areas of indigenous territory. Many speakers introduced their remarks by singing their personal ‘anger-songs’, customarily sung when going into battle, and some warned that they would go to war if necessary to stop construction of the Belo Monte dam, planned as the first of the series. They also denounced Brazilian President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva and Eletronorte, the government agency responsible for the dams, for failing to disclose the true scope of the project. The government has represented it for public consumption as involving a single dam at Belo Monte, whereas in fact it envisages four additional dams which would be essential for Belo Monte to operate with maximum efficiency (Switkes 2005). Speakers further denounced Lula and Eletronorte for violating Article 321 of the Brazilian constitution, which requires that development projects planned for indigenous areas should be debated by the National Congress, with the participation of representatives from the affected communities. Neither Eletronorte nor governmental proponents of the dams had made any attempt to comply with this requirement.

An independent legal challenge to this constitutional violation led to a dramatic moment at the Piaçarçu meeting. Under pressure from indigenous activists, the Ministério Público (the office of the public prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice, the equivalent of an Attorney General), had instigated federal court proceedings against Eletronorte to halt all work on the dams (including planning) while the government remained in violation of the constitution. In the midst of the Kayapo meeting, on 30 March, news arrived that a federal judge in the nearby city of Altamira had found for the plaintiffs in this suit, and issued an injunction halting all work on the dams. Many at the meeting felt that the mobilization of the Kayapo for the renewed struggle against the dams had played a part in influencing the judge’s verdict. Whether or not this was true, it contributed to the general feeling of those at the meeting that they were on a roll and could win despite the odds. In May the judge’s decision was sustained on appeal by a federal judge in Brasilia, with the Ministério Público acting for the plaintiffs. The entire Xingú dam scheme may well now have to be abandoned.

Forging an alliance with the whites

Immediately following the successful conclusion of the 2006 Piaçarçu meeting, Megaron initiated the next and biggest step in the Kayapo alliance-building process: contacting the leaders of regional Brazilian settler organizations to persuade them to join with the Kayapo and their indigenous allies in the campaign to save the Xingú from the dams and pollution. He proposed that Indians and settlers should jointly organize a great rally in Altamira in opposition to the dams and other environmentally destructive developments, including logging, mining and river pollution. Brazilian settlers have historically tended to be hostile or at best indifferent to Indians, but they have for their own reasons become opposed to the construction of the proposed dams and the pollution of the river.
The response of the leaders of settler organizations to Megaron’s overtures was enthusiastically positive.

As Megaron said in the Declaration of Piaraçu, circu-
lated to NGOs and the media immediately following the Piaraçu meeting:

We Mebengokre are aware that the problems that threaten the lives of our communities in the Xingú Valley also threaten other peoples, both indigenous and Brazilian, who live in the valley. The solution of these problems, and thus the effective protection of our river and our forest, lies in a common struggle, which we share with all the peoples of the Xingú Valley.

Eighteen months ago, we met together with the other indige-
 nous peoples of the Upper, Middle and Lower Xingú in Piaraçu to forge a common front against these threats. Now, following upon the successful conclusion of the meeting of all of our own communities, we are entering upon the next stage of our struggle, contacting organizations of national Brazilian settlers of the Lower Xingú and the Transamazonica [highway] to form an alliance of all the peoples of the Valley of the Xingú to save our river from the dams, pollution, and all kinds of destructive development, and to promote alternative forms of production based on the powers of local communities using sustainable resources.

We call on all the inhabitants of the Xingú Valley to join with us in a great rally at Altamira against the Belo Monte dam and the other dams that Eletronorte wants to build throughout our valley, and for the protection and development of our own pro-
ductive powers, our cultures and communities. (Tuukaramá 2006; English translation T. Turner)

Collective effervescence and the creation of ritual

The March Piaraçu meeting was a historic achievement for the Kayapo: the first time that all Kayapo communities had united for a common cause under a common leadership. There was a feeling of excitement among those present that they were being part of something new and im-
portant – the emergence of a united Kayapo political commu-
nity. This feeling was expressed in Kayapo cultural terms through the performance of a new ceremony, composed for the occasion, at the close of the meeting. In this ritual young, recently proclaimed chiefs (benhadjiwóó) handed seedlings from the fruit-bearing piki tree to senior chiefs, elder statesmen whose pan-communal authority is recog-
nized by all Kayapo. The elder chiefs proceeded to plant the seedlings, and while standing over them, exhorted the younger chiefs to step into the roles that they, the elders, were about to vacate, to assure the continuity of Kayapo culture (kukrádjí) and social order.

The ritual dramatized the meeting’s call for the collective defence and renewal of Kayapo society as a political community. Notably, two of the four senior chiefs who took part in the ritual chose as their partners young chiefs from villages other than their own, a departure from normal Kayapo practice in which succession to the chiefly office is through proclamation by a senior chief of the same community. This gesture (which surprised some of those present, including some who had shared in creating the new ritual during the meeting) expressed the senior chiefs’ understanding that through this meeting, the Kayapo had constituted themselves as a political community at a level higher than that of individual villages. At the same time, the ritual dramatized the dual significance of the Kayapo resistance to the dams as both protection of their territory and, more fundamentally, a defence of their way of life.

The wider context: Development at any cost vs. Amazonian rivers, forests and peoples

The consolidation of a political movement integrating all the Kayapo communities in alliance with the other indigenous groups and Brazilian settler movements of the Xingú valley was both motivated and threatened by omi-
nous developments in the policies of the government of President Lula da Silva and the state government of Mato Grosso. By the time of the Piaraçu meeting of February-
March 2006 it had become clear that the Lula government had adopted a developmentalist programme of promoting big capital-intensive infrastructural projects, such as hydroelectric dams and the paving of interstate roads like the Cuiabá-Santarém highway (BR-163), at the expense of environmental, social and human rights concerns.
These projects are key elements in the federal government’s IMF-inspired strategy of increasing exports to pay off Brazil’s foreign debt. In the concrete forms of the Xingu dam projects and the proposal to pave BR-163 to enable the transportation of the huge soya, rice and maize crops of Mato Grosso’s burgeoning agribusiness economy to the ports of Santarem and Belem, these policies were already casting long shadows over the Kayapo homeland. In the months following the Piaracu meeting, however, a series of further events served both to highlight and to intensify the threats from these projects and the collateral effects of the more general policy orientation of the national and state governments that gave rise to them.

By 2005 it had become evident that the demarcation of indigenous territories as reserves by the National Indian Foundation, opposed by local landholders and developmentalist interests alike, had virtually come to a halt (over 200 indigenous territories remained under-demarcated). The Lula government, represented by Mérico Gomes, president of FUNAI, appeared to have put the protection of indigenous lands on hold in an effort to accommodate these interests.

For the Kayapo and most other indigenous groups, not to mention numerous NGOs, anthropologists and journalists, Gomes’ leadership of FUNAI had become identified with Lula’s policy for developing Amazonia without regard for constitutional and legal safeguards of indigenous and environmental rights. Stung by criticism from these sources, Gomes gave an interview to Reuters news agency in January 2006 defending FUNAI’s general record but adding the startling assertion, for one in his position, that the Indians’ demand for the demarcation of their land as reserves ‘was going beyond acceptable limits’, and suggesting that the Supreme Court should consider imposing a cap on the proportion of the national territory that can be allotted to Indian reserves (MS 13/01/06; Estado de São Paulo, Section A-4, 13/01/06).

This overt avowal of what many had come to suspect was the real attitude behind the government’s Indian policy caused a storm of protest among indigenous groups and NGOs supporting them. The Kayapo called a meeting of 23 of their leaders and sent off a fiery protest to Lula, which called for a general change of policy towards Indians and the dismissal of Gomes as president of FUNAI (MS 30/01/06; Carmen Figueiredo, personal communication).

The road to Santarem is paved with questionable intentions

Meanwhile, in what began as a separate dispute over the social and environmental effects of development projects, the federal government’s attempt to evade its own law that calls for Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) as prerequisites for licensing projects such as the paving of BR-163 led to a renewed crisis with the Kayapo. The Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of the Environment began well enough in mid-2005 by holding two legally prescribed public hearings in the Xingu valley for all groups who would be affected by the road project. They were invited to present their views on the measures that should be taken to protect their rights and interests from the influx of construction crews, settlers and deforestation that the road improvement would bring.

Testimony at such hearings is supposed to be taken into account in the preparation of the EIA, and thus incorporated into the final design and operation of the project. The Kayapo sent delegations to both hearings that made detailed submissions. Their statements did not oppose the paving of the road in itself, but called for it to be accompanied by policing of the boundaries of the Kayapo and Panara reserves that lie close to the road, the demarcation of still undemarcated territories farther to the north, compensation for environmental damage, and continued consultation with the Indians on dealing with the social problems certain to arise from increased road traffic and the influx of settlers. After these hearings, nothing was heard about the paving project for several months.

In December 2005, however, the government institute responsible for the protection of the Amazon, IBAMA, quietly granted a preliminary licence to the Ministry of
Transport to proceed with plans for the paving of BR-163. This was irregular, since the Environmental Impact Assessment normally required for such a licence had not yet been completed. The delay had been caused by disagreements between the Ministry of the Environment and its agency, IBAMA, and the Ministry of Transport over the terms of the EIA.

After six months the dispute was finally ‘solved’ by the Minister of the Environment, Marina Silva, who in early June produced a new ‘Plan for a sustainable BR-163’ designed to substitute for the legally required EIA and thus allow the licence granted six months earlier to be activated (MS 06/06/06; 29/06/06). The plan contained provisions for protected forest zones beside the road but took no account of the proposals by the Kayapo for the demarcation and police protection of indigenous communities located near the road.

This bureaucratic manoeuvre was completed without consulting the Kayapo or any of the other indigenous or regional groups who had faithfully attended the hearings for the EIA and contributed their critical inputs (MS 06/06/06). The result was triumphantly announced by Lula in a speech on 6 June, followed a month later by a short report in the official Gazette of Mato Grosso that the licence had been issued and paving would proceed without reference to the legally required EIA (AA 22/12/05; MS 06/06/06, 12/06/06; A Gazeta de Cuiabá 2006).

The (paved) road shall not pass!

When this came to the notice of the Kayapo, they were furious. They felt that they had been betrayed by the government’s hearings for the EIA, which they now saw as having been a ruse to distract them while the government secretly went ahead with its plans to proceed with the project without regard for the environmental and social protections, to say nothing of the consultations with them and other indigenous groups of the area, required by its own laws. Kayapo and Panara leaders from the Xingú valley met in the second week of July and agreed to take immediate action. They wrote to Lula denouncing his government’s violation of Brazilian law and human rights, and to the president of the World Bank urging him not to grant a loan for the road-paving project. A third letter went to the Attorney General of Brazil, calling upon him to enforce the law and vowing to prevent the road from being paved until the government decided to comply with its own laws covering licensing and EIAs.

Then, making good on their promise, they sent a party to blockade BR-163. For good measure, they also cut BR-80, the federal highway that serves as their boundary with the National Park of the Xingú to the south, by lowering the ferry that carries road traffic across the Xingú. They maintained the closure of both roads for four days, from 22 to 26 July, which was how long it took the federal government and the state government of Mato Grosso to agree to the Kayapo’s condition for calling off the blockade. This was to send high-level representatives to a meeting with Kayapo leaders to discuss the restitution of the environmental and social protections demanded by the Kayapo and others in the public hearings for the EIA (Megaron Txukarramãe, personal communication; MS 25-27/07/06).

The meeting was held on 26 July at the Kayapo-controlled FUNAI headquarters in Colider, Mato Grosso. After sitting through a day of harangues by Kayapo leaders interspersed with periodic eruptions of chanting and dancing by about 100 or so Kayapo and Indians from other groups that had participated in the roadblock alongside the Kayapo, the government representatives promised to produce a revised version of the road paving project incorporating the Kayapo demands within 30 days. This was the grace period granted by the Kayapo before the blockade of the roads would be renewed if no response were forthcoming (Sue Cunningham, personal communication).
Standoff
After the Brazilian representatives left, the Kayapo leaders themselves departed for Brasilia, where on or about 5 August they proceeded to picket the FUNAI head offices, demanding the immediate dismissal of president Gomes and his replacement with an Indian (MS 18/08/06). The Kayapo were joined by the equally militant Xavante nation, and the Amazonian Indian Federation COIAB issued a fresh manifesto calling for Gomes’ dismissal. The COIAB text was largely based on the Kayapo letter to Lula sent from the Colider meeting a few weeks earlier, and was clearly intended to support the Kayapo action (MS 11/08/06, 18/08/06).

Gomes succeeded in avoiding a showdown with the Kayapo and kept his job, but his authority was weakened by the public defiance and criticism of the Kayapo and the other indigenous groups who supported them. As for BR-163, the Ministry of Transportation waited until the end of the 30-day period the Kayapo had set for them to produce their revision of the paving project. Warned that the Kayapo were preparing to renew their roadblock, however, the Ministry called in Carmen Figueiredo, an expert from FUNAI who had been working closely with the Kayapo on the road situation, and invited her to rewrite the relevant provisions of the project, incorporating the Kayapo demands.

As of this writing, it thus appears that the Kayapo have won their battle to make the state fulfil its legal obligations to protect their social and environmental rights in carrying out its BR-163 project. In the process they have performed an important service for all Amazonian peoples by publicizing the prevailing pattern of government malfeasance and evasion of legally mandated environmental protections in the construction and improvement of roads in the region (Carmen Figueiredo, personal communication).

As if to emphasize further the interdependence of these issues with the Lula government’s developmentalist program, on 15 August, some 10 days after the start of the Kayapo picketing of FUNAI, Lula made a speech vowing that the Belo Monte dam, as well as others on the Rio Madeira, would be built. He made no mention of the judicial injunction now in effect against all further work on Belo Monte, or the views and rights of the indigenous and Brazilian settler communities of the Xingú valley, or the numerous expert warnings of the environmental and economic devastation the dams would cause (AM 16/08/06, Swifts 2005).

The sources of Kayapo powers of resistance
It is against this developmentalist climate of opinion in the Lula government and its disregard for Brazilian law, as well as human rights and environmental values, that the Kayapo have taken their stand. Although few in number and only marginally integrated into the national society, culture and economy, they have been able to make themselves the centre of a wide and ethnically diverse network of alliances with Amazonian peoples, including both indigenous and national Brazilian communities, and to attract support from an equally diverse assortment of groups from national and international civil society. They have been able to build this network by evoking the common interests of all these groups in preserving the human and environmental values which Brazilian governments, in their pursuit of developmentalist policies, have been prepared to sacrifice.

Behind the national and state governments’ obsessive advocacy of environmentally destructive mega-projects, of course, has been the relentless pressure of the global economy and its organs the IMF, international development banks and the WTO, which utilize Brazil’s large foreign debt as leverage to compel adoption of capital-intensive developmentalist economic policies.

While boldly and effectively organizing resistance to government projects, however, the Kayapo have cannily

Fig. 7. Chief Rôni hurangues Brazilian federal and state government representatives at a meeting on 26 July, over the Brazilian government’s failure to comply with environmental laws relating to the paving of the Cuiaba-Santarém highway.


A Gazette de Cuiaba 2006. A Gazette of the state of Mato Grosso, 4 July.


ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY VOL 22 NO 5, OCTOBER 2006
managed to present themselves as defenders of Brazilian law against Brazilian national and state governments with rogue developmentalist agendas that flagrantly violate standing Brazilian legislation for the protection of indigenous peoples’ territorial and human rights and environmental values. In the process they have managed to gain the support of significant sectors of Brazilian political opinion and state apparatuses, including important elements of the legal and judicial establishments, some government ministries and elected members of Congress, including agents of FUNAI itself.

Kayapo leaders like Megaron have even been able to gain appointments to strategic regional posts within the administrative structure of FUNAI. In contrast to Scott’s scenario of ‘weapons of the weak’ to which we alluded at the beginning of this article, in short, the state does not confront the Kayapo as a monolithic entity with an effective monopoly of political-economic and ideological hegemony. On the contrary, it is a heterogeneous collection of actors and agencies, many with programmes of their own that are to varying degrees opposed to the developmentalist policies of the head of state. The Kayapo, as we have seen, have been able to co-opt some of these discordant state powers as ‘weapons’ in their own struggles with federal and state governments.

In a similar way, the Kayapo have managed to attract significant support from new domestic and international social movements (NSMs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The growth of these essentially middle-class movements committed to universal values and causes such as human rights and environmentalism, often opposed to the interests and projects of globalized capital, has been a prominent feature of the social dynamics of globalization.

The Kayapo, with some help from anthropologists and NGO representatives, quickly understood that their struggles for territorial and cultural rights and protection of their environment converged in important, if not all, respects with the causes being fostered by these movements. A crucial part of that understanding was the importance of overtly representing themselves as a group of distinctive identity capable of acting independently in defence of their cultures, lands and environment. In contrast to the covert forms of resistance or ‘hidden transcripts’ that James Scott has suggested are the essential ‘weapons of the weak’, in other words, the Kayapo have developed a flamboyantly ‘open transcript’, consisting of their own overt representations and public acts of opposition to Brazilian state policies and powers (cf. Scott 1985, 1990; Turner 1991, 1992).

An important aspect of this ‘open transcript’ has been the Kayapo’s development of new forms and techniques of representation, including the creative use of new media such as video but also adaptations of their traditional cultural forms such as ritual choreography and self-decoration, employed in staging demonstrations and political confrontations. These innovative forms of representation, and the support from national and international civil society they have helped to win, in sum, have also been important ‘weapons’ in the Kayapo struggle (Fajans-Turner 2004, Turner 1991, Keck and Sikkink 1998).

The Kayapo have been able to co-opt and employ the powers derived from these extraneous sources by drawing upon the political qualities and cultural resources developed in their traditional system. These qualities were epitomized by their creation of the inter-ethnic alliance of ‘peoples of the Xingu’ at the Piaçu meeting of 2003 (Fajans-Turner and Turner 2005) and the new level of ritually grounded political unity for their own people at the 2006 Piaçu meeting described at the beginning of this article. If the peoples and ecosystem of the Amazon are to be saved from the ravages of the Brazilian regime’s developmentalist policies, they will owe much to the Kayapo’s ability to exploit the conflicting currents of global civil society and discordant elements of modern state regimes as sources of new powers of resistance and adaptation.